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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Section 78 A4-103(2)(h), as this is a domestic relations case. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(h)
(2008).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining alimony where it
included child support in the calculation of Tamara's income, did not provide Tamara
with the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and failed to make adequate
factual findings?
Standard of Review: A trial court's award of alimony is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, f 7, 80 P.3d 153; Andrus v.
Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, f 9, 169 P.3d 754.
Issue Preserved for Appeal: Tamara preserved this issue for appeal where she
argued the following in her motion for a new trial: (1) the court used the wrong standard
in determining alimony by failing to properly consider the lifestyle of the parties in
calculating Tamara's needs (R. 182); (2) the court failed to address "the statutory
requirement to equalize the parties' respective standards of living" (Id.); and (3) the
court included child support in Tamara's income for purposes of determining alimony
(id.).
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PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND
REGULATIONS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, or regulations that are
determinative of this case.
Statutes:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(8)(a) provides:

(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both

2
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spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may
not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from an alimony determination. The court ordered alimony
of $800 per month after the parties' residence is sold ($1,008.31 before it is sold) for a
period of time equal to the length of the marriage. (R. 212.) David has gross monthly
income of $9,927.94 (R. 174-75) and Tamara's gross monthly income, excluding child
support, is $2,754.43 (see R. 173).
Tamara argues that the $800 per month alimony award does not provide her with
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and leaves a large disparity in the
parties' standards of living. She also argues that the court improperly included child
support in the computation of her income and expenses. Furthermore, the court abused
3
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its discretion by failing to calculate David's ability to pay support after child support
terminates. Tamara now appeals the trial court's alimony determination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Tamara Turner Dobson and David C. Dobson ("the parties") were married on

May 6, 1989, in Houston, Texas. (R. 168, f 1.) At the time of trial Tamara was 53 years
old. (R. 238 at 6.)

I

2.

The parties were married for twenty years and two months. (R. 176, f 24.)

3.

Of the parties' three children born of issue during the marriage, one child had

reached her majority at the time of trial. (R. at 169, f 5.)
4.

The birth dates of the two minor children are February 3, 1993 (R. 215-16, f 2)

and July 13, 1995 (R. 169,15).
5.

Tamara filed for divorce on July 30, 2008 (R. 1) when the parties were residing in

the same house (R. 12,112).
6.

The court held a trial on July 27, 2009 (R. 163) primarily on the issues of each

party's income as it related to child support and alimony (R. 124-25), and whether a loan
David's father made for the purchase of their residence constituted a marital debt. (R.
125-26.)
7.

The court awarded Tamara sole legal and sole physical custody of the parties'

minor children, subject to David's reasonable parent time. (R. 210,12.)
8.

The court ordered David to pay child support in the amount of $ 1,582.70 per

month, less $84.70, which is Tamara's share of the children's health insurance premium.

4
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(R. 211,15.)
9.

The court ordered the parties' personal property to be divided equally. (R. 212.)

Tamara was awarded the 2001 Sequoia that was valued at $8,375.00, and David was
awarded the 2002 Subaru Impreza Outback that was valued at $5,650.00. (R. 212,17; R.
177,H30.)
10.

The court ordered the bank accounts (totaling between $8,000 and $9,000 (R. 87))

to be equally divided. (R. 213,115.)
11.

The marital home was valued at $584,300 in a 2008 property valuation. (R. 86.)

The mortgages on the home included a first mortgage of $223,444.26 and a second
mortgage of $53,458.16. (Id.) The court ordered the home to "be sold, with the net
proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. The marital obligation of $25,000.00
regarding the loan to the Respondent [(David)] from the Respondent's father should be
paid to the Respondent prior to the division of the net proceeds. That until the home is
sold, the Petitioner [(Tamara)] shall be solely responsible to pay the first and second
mortgages." (R. 212-13,112.)
12.

The parties had three retirement accounts with values of $122,475.00, $171,724.00

and $2,327.01. (R. at 142.) David had life insurance with a face amount of $200,000.00
(R. 89) and Tamara had life insurance with a face amount of $19,000.00 (R. 143). The
court ordered the parties' "retirement savings and benefits [to] be equally divided
between the parties pursuant to the Woodward formula." (R. 213,113.)
13.

The court found that Tamara was employed since June 2007 with Jet Blue as a

reservation agent making approximately $10.00 per hour. (R. 171.) Before she obtained
5
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her employment at Jet Blue, Tamara was out of the workforce for approximately sixteen
years (R. 156, ^ 15), and was a stay-at-home mother (R. 11, If 5).
14.

The court found Tamara to be underemployed (R. 171, ^ 14) based in part on the

following:
a)

Tamara conducted a "relatively minimal job search" before obtaining her position

at Jet Blue, applying for "a number of research positions at the University of Utah, a job
at Hogle Zoo, and a job at a culinary store." (R. 171,113.) [Tamara testified to applying
for six or seven research positions at the University of Utah. (R. 238 at 12.)]
b)

Tamara was a software engineer from approximately 1986 to 1990 for Tecmag,

Inc. (R. 171-72.)
c)

"[Tamara] is highly educated, having received her bachelor's degree from Grinnell

College in 1979, a masters degree from Rice University in 1986, and between 1979 and
1985, having attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill." (R. 172, f ll(iv).)
15.

The court also based its finding of underemployment on the testimony of Dr.

Kristie Farnsworth. (R. 172.) The parties had stipulated that Dr. Farnsworth conduct an
analysis of Tamara's employability. (R. 172, | ll(v).) The court adopted the following
testimony of Dr. Farnsworth in its Findings of Facts ((R. 172, | ll(vi-vii).):
a)

"[B]ased on the current labor market, [Tamara's] immediate starting salary could

be expected to be between $29,830.00 and $32,480.00 annually."
b)

"If [Tamara] upgraded her skills she could expect a starting salary ranging

between $46,370.00 and $58,400.00 annually."
6
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c)

"Although [Tamrara] has been out of the workplace for many years, she has work

skills, a high level of education, and is capable of earning a greater income than she is
currently earning."
16.

The court balanced two considerations in determining the income Tamara is

capable of earning: "the Court finds it is inappropriate to utilize the income petitioner is
earning as a reservation agent, as she does have the immediate ability, without upgrading
her work skills, to earn greater income. However, it is similarly inappropriate to award
alimony based on skills and training which petitioner does not yet possess and will
require significant time to obtain." (R. 173, Tf 15.)
17.

The court imputed gross income to Tamara of $2,500.00 per month "which is at

the low range of what Dr. Farnsworth testified would be [Tamara's] immediate starting
salary based upon her current skills." (R. 173, f 16.)
18.

The court determined Tamara's reasonable deductions from a gross income of

$2,500.00 to be $375.00, resulting in a net income of $2,125.00 per month. (R. 175.)
19.

The court reduced Tamara's monthly expenses by approximately 21% ($1,237.11)

from $5,953.63 (R. 144) to $4,716.52 (R. 173). The court made the following reductions
to Tamara's itemized expenses:
a)

Reduced mortgage payment $208.31, from $2,208.31 to $2,000.00 on the basis

that "the house would be sold and that each party would wish to find housing with a
payment of approximately that amount." (R. 174, ^ 18(i).)
b)

Reduced food and household expenses $263.42, from $1,013.42 to $750.00,

"based on the Court's experience that a monthly amount of $250.00 is reasonable for
7
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each person residing in the household." (R. 174, ^ 18(h).)
c)

Reduced telephone expense by $113.68, from $363.68 to $250.00, "based on the

court's experience that the services can be provided for much less than petitioner is now
paying." (R. 174,118(iii).)
d)

Reduced clothing allowance by $56.97, from $256.97 to $200.00, and the court

did not provide a basis for the reduction. (R. 174,118(iv).)
e)

Reduced the school expense by $71.79, from $171.79 to $100.00 "based on

testimony that the children are no longer taking piano lessons." (R. 174, f 18(v).)
f)

Reduced the gifts and donations expenses by $170.00, from $270.00 to $100.00,

and the court did not provide a basis for the reduction. (R. 174,118(vi).)
g)

Reduced auto expenses by $165.00 from $365.00 to $200.00, and the court did not

provide a basis for the reduction. (R. 174,118(vii).)
h)

Reduced personal care and gym expenses by $ 187.94, from $287.94 to $ 100.00

and the court did not provide a basis for the reduction. (R. 174, f 18(viii).)
20.

Tamara's expenses include $483.99 under prescriptions and copays. (R. 238 at 24.)

Tamara is taking about five medications because she had a bicycle accident in 2002 and
suffered a traumatic brain injury. (Id)
21.

The court found that after adding Tamara's net imputed income from employment

of $2,125.00, anticipated child support of $1,582.70, and dividend income of $254.43,
Tamara had $3,962.13 to meet her monthly expenses. (R. 173, ^ 17.) Upon subtracting
her reasonable monthly expenses of $4,716.52, Tamara had a shortfall of $754.39, which
suggested she is in need of support. (R. 174, {\ 19.)
8
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22.

David is a tenured professor of mathematics at the University of Utah. (R. 238 at

36.)
23.

The court determined that David's gross monthly income was $9,927.94. (R. 174-

75, Tj 20.) After subtracting reasonable monthly deductions of $2,949.22, his net available
income was calculated to be $6,350.70. (R. 175,121.)
24.

The court disallowed one of David's items of monthly expenses (installment

payments of $630.13) on the basis that "no evidence was presented at trial that allows the
Court to determine the nature of this debt." (R. 175.)
25.

The court found David's reasonable monthly expenses to be $3,766.53. (R. 175, f

22.) Adding child support of $1,582.70 to that amount left David with $5,349.23 in
monthly obligations. (R. 175, 1 23.) After subtracting David's net available income of
$6,350.70 from his monthly obligations of $5,349.23, David was left with disposable
income of $1,001.45, "suggesting that requiring [David] to provide such support is
reasonable." (R. 176,123.)
26.

The court awarded alimony to Tamara in the "amount of $800 per month. Alimony

shall continue until the death of either party, the Petitioner's remarriage or cohabitation,
or until September 30, 2029, whichever occurs sooner. However, until the home is sold,
provided that [Tamara] makes reasonable good faith efforts to sell the home, alimony
shall be $1,008.31." (R. 212,16.)
27.

Tamara made a motion for a new trial on August 21, 2009 (R. 182) based on the

following:
a)

The court used the wrong standard in determining alimony by failing to properly
9
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consider the lifestyle of the parties in calculating Tamara's needs. (Id.)
b)

The court failed to address "the statutory requirement to equalize the parties'

respective standards of living." {Id.)
c)

The court included child support in Tamara's income for purposes of determining

alimony. (Id.) Child support is supposed to be for the children's needs and is not an
alimony award. (R. 183.) Furthermore, child support will shortly end for one child and
will end for the remaining child in approximately July 2013. (R. 182.) The court should
have considered the termination of child support in determining Tamara's needs and
expenses (see R. 183) and in considering the comparative standards of living of the
parties.
28.

The court denied Tamara's Motion for a New Trial (R. 215,1} 1) and she now

appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly included child support in the calculation of Tamara's
income and improperly included her children's expenses in the calculation of her
expenses. The court also failed to calculate David's ability to pay spousal support after
the termination of child support. It was an abuse of discretion to make an alimony award
that did not provide Tamara with the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage
and left such a large disparity in the parties' standards of living. The trial court failed to
make adequate findings of fact in reducing Tamara's expenses and her monthly
deductions and made a significant mathematical error. The court also abused its

10
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discretion in imputing additional income to Tamara where she was 53 years old and had
been out of the workforce for approximately sixteen years.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING
ALIMONY WHERE IT INCLUDED CHILD SUPPORT IN THE CALCULATION
OF TAMARA'S INCOME, DID NOT PROVIDE TAMARA WITH THE
STANDARD OF LIVING SHE ENJOYED DURING THE MARRIAGE, AND
FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FACTUAL FINDINGS.
The trial court's determination of alimony constituted an abuse of discretion where
it made several mistakes. First, the court improperly included child support in Tamara's
income and also included the expenses of the children in the calculation of her expenses.
The court also should have calculated David's disposable income after the termination of
child support. Second, the court's alimony award resulted in a serious inequity where it
did not provide Tamara with the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and
left a large disparity in the parties' standards of living. Third, the court failed to make
adequate factual findings when it reduced Tamara's monthly deductions and certain
expenses without any explanation or factual findings. Fourth, the court made a
mathematical error that substantially reduced David's disposable income. Fifth, the court
abused its discretion in imputing additional income to Tamara where she was 53 years
old and had been out of the workforce for approximately sixteen years.
A. Background Alimony Law
Utah trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning alimony awards so long as they
consider the following statutory factors:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
11
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(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse
or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392,19, 197 P.3d 117; UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8)(a)(i)(vii) (Supp. 2008). In addition to considering the above listed statutory factors, "trial courts
must be mindful of the primary purposes of alimony: '(I) to get the parties as close as
possible to the same standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the
standards of living of each party; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a
public charge.'" Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, f 9 (quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT
57, If 7, 201 P.3d 942 (citations omitted)).
If a trial court considers these factors, the appellate court "'will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion.'" Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, \ 26, 9 P.3d 171 (quoting Childs v.
Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)); Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, \ 9; see also
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, t 7, 80 P.3d 153 (stating that a trial court's
award of alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 29 l v ^
9, 169 P.3d 754 (same).

12
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The court in Batty v. Batty cited Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), for the steps a court should take in fashioning an alimony award, and the order in
which these steps should be taken:
First, the trial court should have determined Wife's needs. . . . Second, the
trial court should have determined Wife's ability to meet her own needs.
Such evaluation properly takes into account the result of the property
division, particularly any income-generating property Wife is awarded . . . .
Third, if Wife is not able to meet her own needs, the trial court should have
determined the ability of Husband to fill the gap between Wife's needs and
her own ability to meet those needs.

\

Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506,15, 153 P.3d 827 (citations omitted). If the alimony
recipient is able to meet her own needs, the court should not award any alimony, even if the
other party has ample resources. "[R]egardless of the payor spouse's ability to pay more, 'the
[recipient] spouse's demonstrated need m u s t . . . constitute the maximum permissible alimony
award.'" Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, f 13 (second alteration and omission in original)
(quoting Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)); see also Olson v.
Olson, 2010 UT App 22, f 21, 226 P.3d 751 (same).
B. Fulfilling the Marshalling Requirement
A party challenging a district court's factual findings in an alimony determination has
a duty to marshal the evidence. Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43,ffif19-24, 233 P.3d
489. In Jensen v. Jensen, the court held that the wife had a duty to marshal the evidence
where she argued that the trial court "abused its discretion by imputing excessive income to
her and in determining her financial need." Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, f 12, 197
P.3d 117 (citing Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431).
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As it is necessary to review the facts of the case to determine whether the District
Court abused its discretion in determining alimony, Tamara submits this section in
compliance with the marshalling requirement. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9)
states, "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). To marshal the evidence, "the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the veiy findings the appellant resists." West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82,178, 100 P.3d 1177.
After marshalling the evidence, the appellant must "'then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below.5" Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43,f20 (quoting Chen, 2004 UT 82, f
76) (internal quotations omitted); see also Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315 ("After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a
fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous."); Chen, 2004
UT 82, Tj 77 (same). Appellant sets forth the following evidence which could support the
finding of the District Court.
1. Evidence in Support of the District Court's Order
1.

Tamara Turner Dobson and David C. Dobson ("the parties") were married on May

6, 1989, in Houston, Texas. (R. 168, f 1.) At the time of trial Tamara was 53 years old.
(R. 238 at 6.)
14
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2.

The parties were married for twenty years and two months. (R. 176, 1 24.)

3.

Of the parties' three children born of issue during the marriage, one child had

reached her majority at the time of trial. (R. at 169,1 5.)
4.

The birth dates of the two minor children are February 3, 1993 (R. 215-16, 1 2)

and July 13, 1995 (R. 169,15).
5.

Tamara filed for divorce on July 30, 2008 (R. 1) when the parties were residing in

the same house (R. 12,112).
6.

The court held a trial on July 27, 2009 (R. 163) primarily on the issues of each

party's income as it related to child support and alimony (R. 124-25), and whether a loan
David's father made for the purchase of their residence constituted a marital debt. (R.
125-26.)
7.

The court awarded Tamara sole legal and sole physical custody of the parties'

minor children, subject to David's reasonable parent time. (R. 210,12.)
8.

The court ordered David to pay child support in the amount of $1,582.70 per

month, less $84.70, which is Tamara's share of the children's health insurance premium.
(R. 211,15.)
9.

The court ordered the parties' personal property to be divided equally. (R. 212.)

Tamara was awarded the 2001 Sequoia that was valued at $8,375.00, and David was
awarded the 2002 Subaru Impreza Outback that was valued at $5,650.00. (R. 212,17; R.
177,130.)
10.

The court ordered the bank accounts (totaling between $8,000 and $9,000 (R. 87))

to be equally divided. (R. 213,115.)
15
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11.

The marital home was valued at $584,300 in a 2008 property valuation. (R. 86.)

The mortgages on the home included a first mortgage of $223,444.26 and a second
mortgage of $53,458.16. (Id.) The court ordered the home to "be sold, with the net
proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. The marital obligation of $25,000.00
regarding the loan to the Respondent [(David)] from the Respondent's father should be
paid to the Respondent prior to the division of the net proceeds. That until the home is
sold, the Petitioner [(Tamara)] shall be solely responsible to pay the first and second
mortgages." (R. 212-13,1(12.)
12.

The parties had three retirement accounts with values of $122,475.00, $171,724.00

and $2,327.01. (R. at 142.) David had life insurance with a face amount of $200,000.00
(R. 89) and Tamara had life insurance with a face amount of $19,000.00 (R. 143). The
court ordered the parties' "retirement savings and benefits [to] be equally divided
between the parties pursuant to the Woodward formula." (R. 213,113.)
13.

The court found that Tamara was employed since June 2007 with Jet Blue as a

reservation agent making approximately $10.00 per hour. (R. 171.) Before she obtained
her employment at Jet Blue, Tamara was out of the workforce for approximately sixteen
years (R. 156, f 15), and was a stay-at-home mother (R. 11, f 5).
14.

The court found Tamara to be underemployed (R. 171,114) based in part on the

following:
a)

Tamara conducted a "relatively minimal job search" before obtaining her position

at Jet Blue, applying for "a number of research positions at the University of Utah, a job
at Hogle Zoo, and a job at a culinary store." (R. 171,1} 13.) [Tamara testified to applying
16
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for six or seven research positions at the University of Utah. (R. 238 at 12.)]
b)

Tamara was a software engineer from approximately 1986 to 1990 for Tecmag,

Inc. (R. 171-72.)
c)

"[Tamara] is highly educated, having received her bachelor's degree from Grinnell

College in 1979, a masters degree from Rice University in 1986, and between 1979 and
1985, having attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill." (R. 172,111 (iv).)
15.

The court also based its finding of underemployment on the testimony of Dr.

Kristie Farnsworth. (R. 172.) The parties had stipulated that Dr. Farnsworth conduct an
analysis of Tamara's employability. (R. 172, f ll(v).) The court adopted the following
testimony of Dr. Farnsworth in its Findings of Facts ((R. 172,11 l(vi-vii).):
a)

"[B]ased on the current labor market, [Tamara's] immediate starting salary could

be expected to be between $29,830.00 and $32,480.00 annually."
b)

"If [Tamara] upgraded her skills she could expect a starting salary ranging

between $46,370.00 and $58,400.00 annually."
c)

"Although [Tamrara] has been out of the workplace for many years, she has work

skills, a high level of education, and is capable of earning a greater income than she is
currently earning."
16.

The court balanced two considerations in determining the income Tamara is

capable of earning: "the Court finds it is inappropriate to utilize the income petitioner is
earning as a reservation agent, as she does have the immediate ability, without upgrading
her work skills, to earn greater income. However, it is similarly inappropriate to award
17
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alimony based on skills and training which petitioner does not yet possess and will
require significant time to obtain." (R. 173,f15.)
17.

The court imputed gross income to Tamara of $2,500.00 per month "which is at

the low range of what Dr. Famsworth testified would be [Tamara's] immediate starting
salary based upon her current skills." (R. 173, f 16.)
18.

The court determined Tamara's reasonable deductions from a gross income of

$2,500.00 to be $375.00, resulting in a net income of $2,125.00 per month. (R. 175.)
19.

The court reduced Tamara's monthly expenses by approximately 21 % ($ 1,237.11)

from $5,953.63 (R. 144) to $4,716.52 (R. 173). The court made the following reductions
to Tamara's itemized expenses:
a)

Reduced mortgage payment $208.31, from $2,208.31 to $2,000.00 on the basis

that "the house would be sold and that each party would wish to find housing with a
payment of approximately that amount." (R. 174, f|} 18(i).)
b)

Reduced food and household expenses $263.42, from $1,013.42 to $750.00,

"based on the Court's experience that a monthly amount of $250.00 is reasonable for
each person residing in the household." (R. 174,118(h).)
c)

Reduced telephone expense by $113.68, from $363.68 to $250.00, "based on the

court's experience that the services can be provided for much less than petitioner is now
paying." (R. 174,118(iii).)
d)

Reduced clothing allowance by $56.97, from $256.97 to $200.00, and the court

did not provide a basis. (R. 174,1 18(iv).)
e)

Reduced the school expense by $71.79, from $171.79 to $100.00 "based on
18
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testimony that the children are no longer taking piano lessons." (R. 174, ^ 18(v).)
f)

Reduced the gifts and donations expenses by $170.00, from $270.00 to $100.00,

and the court did not provide a basis. (R. 174,118(vi).)
g)

Reduced auto expenses by $ 165.00 from $365.00 to $200.00, and the court did not

provide a basis for the reduction. (R. 174, ^f 18(vii).)
h)

Reduced personal care and gym expenses by $187.94, from $287.94 to $100.00

and the court did not provide a basis for the reduction. (R. 174, ^f 18(viii).)
20.

Tamara's expenses include $483.99 under prescriptions and copays. (R. 238 at 24.)

Tamara is taking about five medications because she had a bicycle accident in 2002 and
suffered a traumatic brain injury. {Id)
21.

The court found that after adding Tamara's net imputed income from employment

of $2,125.00, anticipated child support of $1,582.70, and dividend income of $254.43,
Tamara had $3,962.13 to meet her monthly expenses. (R. 173,117.) Upon subtracting
her reasonable monthly expenses of $4,716.52, Tamara had a shortfall of $754.39, which
suggested she is in need of support. (R. 174, ^f 19.)
22.

David is a tenured professor of mathematics at the University of Utah. (R. 238 at

36.)
23.

The court determined that David's gross monthly income was $9,927.94. (R. 174-

75,120.) After subtracting reasonable monthly deductions of $2,949.22, his net available
income was calculated to be $6,350.70. (R. 175,121.)
24.

The court disallowed one of David's items of monthly expenses (installment

payments of $630.13) on the basis that "no evidence was presented at trial that allows the
19
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Court to determine the nature of this debt." (R. 175.)
25.

The court found David's reasonable monthly expenses to be $3,766.53. (R., 175, ^

22.) Adding child support of $ 1,582.70 to that amount left David with $5,349.23 in
monthly obligations. (R. 175.4 23.) After subtracting David's net available income of
$6,350.70 from his monthly obligations of $5,349.23, David was left with disposable
income of $ 1,001.45, "suggesting that requiring [David] to provide such support is
reasonable." (R. 176,^23.)
26.

The court awarded alimony to Tamara in the "amount of $800 per month. Alimony

shall continue until the death of either party, the Petitioner's remarriage or cohabitation,
or until September 30, 2029, whichever occurs sooner. However, until the home is sold,
provided that [Tamara] makes reasonable good faith efforts to sell the home, alimony
shall be $1,008.31." (R. 212,16.)
C. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Included Child Support in
its Alimony Calculations
The court's inclusion of child support in Tamara's income and expenses was an
abuse of discretion where it led to miscalculations of her actual income and needs.
Furthermore, the court should have calculated David's ability to pay alimony after the
termination of his child support obligations. The trial court stated that it systematically
included child support in alimony determinations and stated the rationale for its inclusion:
The second basis for requesting a new trial on the issue of alimony is that I
included child support in the funds available to meet the Petitioner's
reasonable needs. And that is something I've done universally in the cases
that I have. And my theory behind that is, is that the financial declaration
submitted by the Petitioner, and is typically the case with a custodial parent,
the reasonable needs includes the reasonable needs of the child. And so the
20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

way that ultimately balances out is when the child reaches majority majority and child support stops - at least in theory - the reasonable needs
decrease commensurate with that because she is under - no longer under a
legal obligation to provide the child's reasonable needs. And that's the
approach I've always taken in these cases.
(R. 239 at 5:16-6:7.) There are some merits to the court's inclusion of child support in the
custodial parent's income and including expenses of the children in the custodial parent's
expenses. Such a system obviates the need for the court and the custodial parent to
hypothesize regarding what the custodial parent's financial needs would be without the
children.
However, there are some major flaws in the court's approach of including child
support in alimony calculations, including the following: (1) it miscalculates the custodial
parent's income, especially for the period of time when alimony continues after child
support ends; (2) it miscalculates the custodial parent's needs, especially for the period of
time when alimony continues after child support ends; and (3) it miscalculates the noncustodial parent's ability to pay alimony after the obligation to pay child support
terminates. In a case such as this where child support shortly ends for both minors (R.
182) and the alimony award could continue until September, 2029 (R. 212, f 6), the
consequences of such miscalculations are substantial.
1. Including child support in Tamara's income is contrary to precedent,
statute, and led to an incorrect computation of her income.
The trial court abused its discretion by including child support in Tamara's income
in its alimony determination. In her Motion for a New Trial, Tamara argued that including
child support in her income for purposes of calculating alimony "is erroneous as . . . child
21
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support is . . . for the children's needs and is not an alimony award." (R. 183.) There is
support for this proposition in case law: "child support paid by Mr. Williamson to Ms.
Williamson is earmarked for the parties' minor child and should not be considered as
income to Ms. Williamson for purposes of calculating alimony." Williamson v.
Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, U 12, 983 P.2d 1103. ut [T]he basic and unalienable right
to child support... is vested in the minor.'" Id. {quoting Reick v. Reich, 625 P.2d 916,
917 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, combining child support with Tamara's income does not
comply with the requirement in section 30-3-5(8)(a)(ii) to consider "the recipient s
earning capacity or ability to produce income." UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
The trial court clearly included child support in the calculation of Tamara's income
in its alimony determination: "[t]he addition of the anticipated child support in the
amount of $1,582.70 . . . provides petitioner with $3,962.13 to meet her monthly
expenses." (R. 173, If 17.) The inclusion of child support in Tamara's income, along with
other mistakes of the court, led to an alimony award that did not come close to providing
Tamara with the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and left a large
disparity in the standards of living of the parties. (See section D., infra.)
2. Including the expenses of the children in Tamara's expenses for
purposes of computing alimony led to a miscalculation of her needs.
The court's combining of Tamara's expenses with those of the children skewed the
court's calculation of Tamara's needs. It is clear that the court included the expenses of
the children along with Tamara's expenses in calculating her needs, (see R. 239 at 5:1622
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6:7.) The court seemed to be quite aggressive in reducing Tamara's expenses - reducing
them in eight categories. (See R. 173-74.) The court reduced Tamara's monthly expenses
by $1,237.11, approximately 21%, from $5,953.63 to $4,716.52. (SeeR. 173-74.) If we
follow the court's approach (see R. 239 at 5:16-6:7), and subtract child support of
$1,582.20 from Tamara's expenses to determine her expenses without child support, we
are left with $3,133.82. The court found David's reasonable monthly expenses to be
$3,766.53. (R. 175, f 22.) Therefore, the court found that David's reasonable monthly
expenses were $590.23 (19%) more than Tamara's (without child support). The court's
finding seems particularly unjust since Tamara's expenses include $483.99 under
prescriptions and copays. (R. 238 at 24.) Tamara is taking about five medications because
she had a bicycle accident in 2002 and suffered a traumatic brain injury. (Id.) The
court's combining Tamara's expenses with those of her children likely obfuscated the
court's view of Tamara's expenses.
Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) requires a court making an alimony
determination to consider "the financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (Supp. 2007). Combining the needs and expenses of

the children with recipient's needs falls short of the statutory mandate to consider the
"recipient's" needs. See Id.
3. The court should have calculated David's ability to pay alimony after
child support terminates.
Utah Code section 3 0-3 -5 (8)(a)(iii) requires the court to consider "the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support." UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2007).
23
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The trial court's failure to consider David's ability to provide support after termination of
child support ran afoul of this statutory mandate. After David's child support obligations
terminate in July 2013 (R. 182), his ability to pay alimony will have increased in the
amount of child support ($1,582.70), from $1,001.47 to $2,584.17. In its alimony
determination, the court should have considered David's increased ability to pay alimony
after the termination of child support.
In Richardson v. Richardson, the court addressed some of the concerns stated
above when it reviewed the trial court's decision to increase alimony as child support
terminated for the children:
However, as his child support obligations terminate over time, his ability to
pay support to Ms. Richardson increases while her ability to meet her own
needs decreases. Without the addition of incremental increases in alimony
payments to Ms. Richardson upon termination of child support, the parties'
gross monthly incomes would be significantly disproportionate, and she
would not be able to enjoy the standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage.
Richardson v. Richardson, 2007 UT App 222, slip op. No. 20060575 (June 21, 2007).
In light of the foregoing problems with the trial court's approach, it was an abuse
of discretion for the court to include child support in the calculation of Tamara's income
and to fail to calculate the effect of the termination of child support on her needs, her
income, and David's ability to provide support. The failure to consider and make
adequate findings of fact regarding the statutory factors constitutes reversible error.
Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, f 17, 169 P.3d 754. This Court should reverse the
trial court's alimony determination because it failed to adequately consider the statutory
factors.
24
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D. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Setting the Alimony Award
Where it is Insufficient to Provide Tamara with the Standard of Living She
Enjoyed During the Marriage.
If a trial court considers the factors listed in Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a), the court
of appeals will not disturb the alimony award unless there is "a serious inequity . ..
manifesting] a clear abuse of discretion." Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, | 9, 197 P.3d
117 (quoting Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236,126, 9 P.3d 171). In the instant case, the
alimony award resulted in a serious inequity, where the alimony award did not provide
Tamara with the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and left a large gap in the
parties' standards of living.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider one of the primary purposes
of alimony, which is to approximate the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. The
court in Jensen stated the rationale underlying the concept of alimony: "trial courts must be
mindful of the primary purposes of alimony: '(1) to get the parties as close as possible to the
same standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of
living of each party; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge.'"
Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, | 9. (quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, If 7, 201
P.3d 942 (citations omitted)); see also Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (stating that '"the most important function of alimony is to provide support for the
wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge'" (quoting Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
1075 (Utah 1985)). "The ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the party receiving
alimony will be able to support him or herself 'as nearly as possible at the standard of living
25
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enjoyed during the marriage."' Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(d)
states, "[t]he court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living." UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8)(d) (Supp. 2008).
The court in Batty v. Batty stated that in calculating the needs of an alimony recipient,
the court should include that which is sufficient to maintain the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage, and not simply that which is needed for bare subsistence: "Her needs are
not simply those things needed for survival." Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, | 5, 153 P.3d
827 (citing Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1978) (affirming trial court's alimony
award, notwithstanding the trial court's finding that "'in one sense [the wife] does not need
alimony in that she could probably subsist without it, and in fact, has done so for
approximately the last two years'") (emphasis omitted)). "Instead, Wife's needs 'are assessed
in light of the standard of living [the parties] had during marriage.'" Batty, 2006 UT App 506,
f 5 (alterations in original) (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991)).
A comparison of Tamara and David's gross income will show that the court's alimony
award of $800.00 did not come close to equalizing the parties' standards of living or
providing for Tamara the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. The court found
David's gross monthly income to be $9,927.94. (R. 174-75.) Tamara's gross monthly
income, including imputed wages of $2,500.00 (R. 173), dividends of $254.43 {Id.), and not
including child support of $1,582.70, would be $ 2,754.43. David's gross monthly income of
$9,927.94 is approximately 3.6 times greater than Tamara's gross monthly income of
$2,754.43. If we adjust the gross incomes of the parties by the court ordered alimony award
26
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of $800.00, David's gross monthly income would be $9,127.94 and Tamara's would be
$3,554.43, leaving David with an income approximately 2.6 times that of Tamara's. In Asper
v. Asper, the court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award nominal
alimony of $1 per year where the husband's income was approximately three times that of the
wife's and the wife worked part-time. Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). In this case, the disparity in the incomes of the parties evidences an abuse of
discretion, especially where the court imputed income to Tamara which increased her actual
income by approximately 42% and refused to use her actual expenses.
E. The Trial Court Failed to Provide Adequate Findings of Fact in Reducing
Tamara's Expenses and Her Monthly Deductions,
The trial court improperly reduced four of Tamara's expense categories and her
monthly deductions without providing a rationale or setting forth factual findings that would
support a reduction. The trial court must consider, at a minimum, the factors set forth in Utah
Code Ann. section 30-3-5(8)(a) in making an alimony determination. Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT
App 214, f 17, 138 P.3d 84. "'Failure to consider these factors [in fashioning an alimony
award] constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, f 9, 223 P.3d
476 (alteration in original) (quoting Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, f 6, 974 P.2d 306).
For each statutory factor, "the trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings
of fact . . . to enable a reviewing court; to ensure that the trial court's
discretionary determination was rationally based upon these . . . factors." Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). These detailed findings "'should .
. . include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41,
Tf 6, 974 P.2d 306 (omission in original) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d
952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). "A trial court's failure to provide adequate
findings [regarding the statutory factors] is reversible error when the facts [that
27
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logically support the findings] are not clear from the record." Andrus v. Andrus,
2007 UT App 291, f 17, 169 P.3d 754.
Connell v. Cornell, 2010 UT App 139, f 12, No. 20080619-CA (Filed May 27, 2010)
(alteration in original).
In this case, the court disregarded the requirement of section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i), which
requires a trial court to consider "the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse" in
making its alimony determination. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (Supp. 2008). The
trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact in reducing Tamara's expenses. A court
must make adequate findings of fact when making "adjustments . . . in the parties' monthly
expenses." Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The court reduced
Tamara's monthly expenses by $1,237.11, approximately 21%, from $5,953.63 to $4,716.52.
(See R. 173-74.) The court reduced her expenses in eight categories, and reduced four of
those expense categories (clothing, gifts and donations, auto expenses, personal care and
gym) without providing any explanation or rationale. (Id.)
The court also failed to provide adequate findings in reducing the monthly
deductions from Tamara's income. The court increased Tamara's income by $733.65
(approximately 42%), from $1,766.35 to $2,500.00 by imputing additional income to her.
(See R. 173.) At the same time, the court decreased her reasonable monthly deductions
$22.05, from $397.05 to $ 375.00 (Id.), and did not provide any findings supporting its
determination that $375.00 was a proper monthly deduction. (Id.) In the hearing
regarding her Motion for a New Trial, Tamara argued that the reasonable monthly
deductions on an imputed income of $2,500.00 should be about $687.00, but the court
28
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stated that it could not consider that argument because it was not presented at trial. (R.
239 at 7.) The court refused to recognize that it couldn't have been argued because the
court used an income figure that didn't exist at trial because it imputed that income to
Tamara.
Tamara testified that her monthly expense figures came from her actual expenses
paid each month. For the court to decrease monthly deductions while dramatically
increasing Tamara's income would seem to require some explanation from the court. As
there were inadequate findings of fact on this issue and also regarding the reductions in
Tamara's expenses, this case should be remanded so the court can provide those factual
findings.
F. The Trial Court Made a Mathematical Error in Computing David's
Disposable Income which Warrants Correction.
It appears that the court made a mathematical subtraction error in computing
David's disposable income. Although this issue was not raised in the trial court, it is
plain error. Generally, "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule applies
to "every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances'
exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must
establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 13, 10 P.3d 346
(citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). In this case, the
29
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mathematical error appears to exist from the record, the error should have been obvious
to the trial court, and the error was harmful to Tamara because it, in conjunction with the
other mistakes of the court, led to an improper alimony calculation.
Using the numbers the court provided of gross monthly income of $9,927.94 and
reasonable monthly deductions of $2,949.22 (R. 174-76), David's net available income
should be $6,978.72, rather than $6,350.70, which is a miscalculation of $628.02.The
miscalculation in net available income had the effect of lowering David's disposable
income by $628.02. On remand, the trial court should correct this error.
G. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imputing Additional Income to
Tamara,
The court increased Tamara's income by $733.65 (approximately 42%), from
$1,766.35 to $2,500.00 by imputing additional income to her. {See R. 173.) The court
imputed additional income to Tamara based on the testimony of an employment expert.
(R. 172.) The court also based its income imputation on the following findings: Tamara
is highly educated (R. 172, ^f 1 l(iv)), was a software engineer from approximately 1986
to 1990 (R. 171-72), and conducted a "relatively minimal job search" before obtaining
her position at Jet Blue (R. 171,113). However, it was an abuse of discretion to impute
additional income to Tamara where she was 53 years old (R. 238 at 6), and had been out
of the workforce for approximately sixteen years (R. 156, Tf 15). Additionally, if Tamara
sought additional education as suggested by Dr. Farnsworth (R. 238 at 48), she would
have to leave her present job. Consequently, Tamara would be unemployed and could not
earn income while she is seeking further education and until she obtains another job,
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which in the present economy is highly speculative as well as problematic. Therefore, it
was an abuse of discretion for the court to impute additional income to Tamara.

CONCLUSION

-

The trial court's determination of alimony constituted an abuse of discretion where
it made several mistakes. The court improperly included child support in Tamara's
income and included the expenses of the children in the calculation of her expenses. The
court also should have calculated David's disposable income after the termination of
child support. Additionally, the court's alimony award resulted in a serious inequity
where it did not provide Tamara with the standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage and left a large disparity in the parties' standards of living. Furthermore, the
court failed to make adequate factual findings when it reduced Tamara's monthly
deductions and certain expenses without an explanation or factual findings. The court
also made a mathematical error that substantially reduced David's disposable income.
Finally, the court abused its discretion in imputing additional income to Tamara where
she was 53 years old and had been out of the workforce for approximately 16 years as a
stay-at-home mother. For the foregoing reasons we ask this court to remand to the trial
court for further proceedings to correct these mistakes.
DATED this j C day of

£bfr X

2010

Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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1. Addendum Table of Contents : Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
August 6, 2009.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMARA TURNER DOBSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
CASE NO. 084903358
vs,
DAVID C. DOBSON,
Respondent

Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Trial in the above noted matter was held on July 27, 2009 in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Petitioner, Tamara Turner Dobson, was present and represented by Randy
S. Ludlow.
Harry

Respondent, David C. Dobson, was present and represented by

Caston.

The

Court

heard

considered the arguments of counsel.

testimony,

received

exhibits,

and

Now being fully advised, the Court

enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings Related to Jurisdiction and Grounds
1

Tamara Turner Dobson and David C. Dobson (hereinafter referred

to as "the parties") were married on May 6, 1989, in Houston, Texas.
2
County,

Both parties are actual and bona fide residents of Salt Lake
State

of

Utah,

and

have

been

for

more

than

three
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immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
3

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties by

virtue of their Utah residency.
4

Irreconcilable differences have arisen which no longer make it

possible for the parties to continue their marital relationship.
Findings Related to Custody and Timesharing
5

Of the three children born as issue of this marriage, one

child, Halina K. Dobson, has achieved her majority.

There are two

remaining minor children, Lara M. Dobson, who was born on February 13,
1996, sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the trial; and Kalinda E.
Dobson, born on July 13, 1995, fourteen (14) years of age at the time of
the trial (hereinafter referred to as "the children").
6

Pursuant

to

the Uniform

Child

Custody

Jurisdiction

and

Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah is the children's home state because the
children lived in Utah with their parents for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the commencement of this action. Therefore, this
Court has jurisdiction to address child custody, visitation, and support
matters.

There

are

no

other

civil,

criminal,

or

juvenile

court

proceedings involving the parties' children that would interfere with
this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
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i
7

Throughout

the

marriage

and

during

the

pendency

of

this

action, petitioner has been the primary caretaker of the children.

The

parties agree that petitioner should have sole physical custody of the
children, but

dispute

whether

Because neither party has

there

submitted

should

be

joint

legal

custody.

a parenting plan, the Court

is

precluded from awarding joint legal custody.

However, having taken all

applicable

finds that

factors into account, the Court

<|

it is in the

children's best•interest for petitioner to have sole physical and legal
custody of the children.
parties may agree.

Respondent is entitled to parent time, as the

If the parties are unable to agree, respondent shall
m

have not less than standard parent time.
Findings Related to Medical Insurance
8

Respondent

employment,

and

is

has

medical

currently

insurance

maintaining

available

medical

through

insurance

his

for

the

m

children.
Findings Related to Child Support
9

Respondent is employed as a professor of mathematics at the

University of Utah.

For the reasons stated in paragraph

twenty

(2 0)

below, the Court determines his gross monthly income to be $9,927.94.
10

The

petitioner

is

currently

employed

by

Jet
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For child support purposes, the parties agree that

her income is $1,766.32.
11

Petitioner's counsel is directed to prepare a child support

sole custody worksheet utilizing these incomes.

From an initial review

of the matter, it appears that respondent's child support obligation will
be approximately $1,582.70 per month.

The Decree will include standard

provisions relating to health insurance, uninsured expenses and workrelated child care.
Findings Related to Alimony
12

Petitioner is currently employed as a reservation agent for

Jet Blue Airlines at a pay rate of approximately $10.00 per hour.
13

Petitioner obtained this employment after a relatively minimal

job search.

Other than positions at Jet Blue, petitioner applied for a

number of research positions at the University of Utah, a job at Hogle
Zoo, and a job at a culinary store.
14

The Court finds that petitioner is underemployed based upon

the following:
i.

Petitioner

commenced

her

current

employment,

as a

reservation agent for Jet Blue Airlines, in June of 2007;
ii.

From approximately 1986 through 1990, the petitioner was
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1
employed as a software engineer for Tecmag, Inc.;
iii.

Through

approximately

1999,

petitioner

worked
g

occasionally as an independent consultant;
iv.

Petitioner

is highly

educated,

having

received her

bachelor's degree from Grinnell College in 1979, a masters degree from
Rice University in 1986, and between 1979 and 1985, having attended the
Massachusetts

'

Institute of Technology, and the University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill;

i
v.

During

the

pendency

of

stipulated that Dr. Kristie Farnsworth

this

action,

the parties

conduct an analysis of the

petitioner's employability;
vi.

I

Dr. Farnsworth testified, and the Court finds, that based

on the current labor market, petitioner's immediate starting salary could
be expected to be between $29,830.00 and $32,480.00 annually;

'

vii. Dr. Farnsworth also testified,' and the Court finds, that
if petitioner upgraded her skills she could expect a starting salary

I
ranging between $46,370.00 and $58,400.00 annually; and
viii. Although petitioner has been out of the workplace for
many years, she has work skills, a high level of education, and is
capable of earning a greater income than she is currently earning.
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In

determining

earning, the Court
petitioner

PAGE 6

the

finds it

income
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that

petitioner

is inappropriate

is

to utilize

capable
the

of

income

is earning as a reservation agent, as she does have the

immediate ability, without upgrading her work skills, to earn greater
income.

However, it is similarly inappropriate to award alimony based

on skills and training which petitioner does not yet possess and will
require significant time to obtain.
16

Balancing both considerations, the Court finds it appropriate

to impute gross monthly income to petitioner of $2,500.00 per month,
which is at the low range of what Dr. Farnsworth testified would be
petitioner's immediate starting salary based upon her current skills.
17

After reasonable monthly deductions of $375.00, petitioner has

net imputed income from employment of $2,125.00.

The addition of the

anticipated child support in the amount of $1,582.70, and dividend income
from

petitioner's

inheritance

in

the

amount

of

$254.43,

provides

petitioner with $3,962.13 to meet her monthly expenses.
18

Petitioner has reasonable monthly expenses of $4,716.52. This

amount was reached by considering the monthly expenses set forth in
petitioner's Exhibit 7, with these adjustments:
i. The mortgage payment was reduced to $2,000.00 per month,
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anticipating that the house would be sold and that each party would wish
to find new housing with a payment of approximately that amount;
ii. The food and household expenses were reduced to $750.00
based upon the Court's experience that a monthly amount of $250.00 is
reasonable for each person residing in the household;
iii. The telephone expense was reduced to $250.00 based upon
the Court's experience that the services can be provided for much less
than petitioner is now paying;
iv. The clothing allowance was reduced to $200.00;
v.

The amount set aside for school was reduced to $100.00,

based on testimony that the children are no longer enrolled in piano
lessons;
vi. Gifts and donations were reduced to $100.00;
vii. Auto expenses were reduced to $200.00; and
viii. The personal

care and gym expenses were

reduced

to

$100.00.
19

The shortfall between petitioner's available income and her

reasonable monthly living expenses is $754.39, suggesting that petitioner
is in need of support.
20

Respondent's

gross

monthly

income

is

determined
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This amount was achieved by averaging the last three years

of respondent's income.

For 2009, the amount of $111,600 was utilized,

which represented respondent's base salary at the University of Utah.
However, evidence at trial demonstrated that respondent has frequently
received grants that supplemented his income.

The last two years that

respondent's income was supplemented by grants were 2008 and 2007, in
which he made $127,268 and $118,538 respectively.

Based upon these

findings, respondent's average annual income is $119,135.33.
21

Allowing respondent his reasonable monthly deductions of

$2,949.22, respondent's net available income is $6,350.70.
22

Respondent has reasonable monthly expenses of $3,766.53. This

amount was reached by taking the expenses set forth in respondent's
Exhibit 1, with the following adjustments:
i.

Respondent's rent or mortgage was increased to $2,000

based upon evidence that he would like the opportunity to purchase
permanent housing once the parties' house sells;
ii.

The installment payment of $63 0.13 was excluded, as no

evidence was presented at trial that allows the Court to determine the
nature of this debt.

Further, because respondent declined to provide

this information, the Court can only conclude that it is an extraordinary
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one-time expenditure, which the Court generally does not consider for
purposes of determining the reasonable monthly expenses considered for
an alimony award that is expected to continue over a significant period
of time.
23

In

addition

respondent

will be

$1,582.70,

leaving

$5,349.23.

to

required

his

reasonable

to pay

respondent

with

child
total

monthly

living

support

in the

monthly

expenses,
amount

obligations

of
of

The difference between respondent's available monthly income

and his reasonable monthly obligations is $1,001.45, suggesting that
requiring respondent to provide such support is reasonable.
24

Based on the foregoing, the Court awards petitioner alimony in

the amount of $800.00 per month.

This amount is based upon the amount

of her shortfall, namely $754.39, which amount was rounded up, since a
significant portion of petitioner's income is currently imputed rather
than actual.

The alimony award will continue

for the length of the

marriage, which the Court determines to be twenty (20) years and two (2)
months, unless terminated earlier by one of the statutory factors.
Findings Related to Loan From the Respondent's Family
25

The parties purchased the marital home in September of 2001.

26

As the parties did not have the $30,000 required for the down
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payment, respondent obtained a loan from his father.

The loan was

memorialized in a document entitled "Loan Contract," which was signed by
respondent in June of 2002.
27

The Court finds that respondent did make payments totaling

$5,000.00 towards this loan, and that the balance owing on the obligation
is $25,000 . 00.
28

The

Court

finds

that

the

loan obligation

is a marital

obligation.
Findings Related to Personal Property
29

The parties' personal property should be divided equally.

30

Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Court finds that

petitioner should be awarded the 2001 Toyota Sequoia, which has a Blue
Book value of $8,375.00.

Respondent should be awarded the 2002 Subaru

Impreza Outback, which has a Blue Book value of $5,650.00.

The parties

may trade vehicles if they so choose.
31

Respondent's 1965 Ford Mustang was obtained by respondent

prior to the marriage and should be awarded to respondent.
32

Respondent should be awarded the 2007 Honda motorcycle.

As

there is an obligation on the motorcycle of approximately $6,215.00, and
the Blue Book value of the motorcycle is $6,080.00, there is no equity.
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I
Respondent is solely responsible for the loan.
33

The 1996 Subaru Impreza, which is the parties' oldest child's

vehicle, shall remain in Halina's possession.

*

Findings Related to Real Property
34

The parties own a home at 4473 S. Abinadi Road, Salt Lake

4
City, Utah. The parties agree that this home should be sold and that the
net proceeds should be divided equally between the parties.
35

Based upon the foregoing, the remaining $25,000.00 obligation

g

on the $3 0,000.00 loan to respondent: from respondent's father should be
paid prior to division of the net proceeds.
Findings Related to Retirement Accounts
36

*

Both parties have accumulated some retirement savings. Those

retirement savings and benefits should be divided between the parties

I
pursuant to the Woodward formula.
Findings Related to Attorney's Fees
37
this case.

Petitioner has requested payment of her attorney's fees in
The financial situation of both parties is such that they

will struggle to recovei: financially from this divorce. Respondent does
not have sufficient assets or income to make a material contribution to
petitioner's attorney's fees.

i

The Court, therefore, elects not to award
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attorney's fees in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The parties agreed that petitioner should be the primary

residential custodian of the parties' children.

The Court declined to

Order joint legal custody, because neither party proposed an appropriate
parenting plan.
2

Child support was determined based upon the parties' gross

monthly income.

For purposes of child support, the parties agreed that

petitioner's actual current income could be utilized.
3

In making its alimony determination, the Court considered the

Jones factors.

The Court first determined the income and reasonable

current living expenses of each party. Using that information, the Court
determined whether petitioner

was

in need

of

respondent was in a position to provide support.

support

and whether

The alimony that was

ordered is consistent with those considerations.
4

In determining that the remaining $25,000.00 obligation on the

$30,000.00 loan from respondent's family should be repaid from the sale
of the parties' residence, the Court considered whether the $30,000 was
the result of a bona fide loan, or a gift.

Because the loan was

documented and disclosed well in advance of the parties' divorce, and
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payments

in

the

amount

of

$5,000

had

been

made

towards

satisfaction of that loan, it appears by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was a bona fide loan. The fact that petitioner's family provided
a gift of $20,000 toward the purchase of the parties' first home does not
affect whether the $30,000 was intended to be a gift or a loan.
5

In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the Court

first considered whether either party was in a position to make a
contribution to the other party's attorney's fees.

Since neither party

is in a financial position to contribute to the other's attorney's fees,
no fees have been awarded.
Respondent's counsel will prepare a Decree consistent with these
Findings.
Dated th is

£/_ ih.day of August, 2009.

ANTHONY B.
D I S T R I C T >?OURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the following,
this Cj?

day of August, 2 009:

Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney for Petitioner
185 S. State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harry Caston
Attorney for Respondent
341 S. Main Street, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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